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Abstract. Ship safety and operations are driving issues of ship design and it is well 
recognized that such performances are strongly related to Human Factor (HF).  In 
the paper a methodology to integrate HF into the ship design process since an early 
stage is envisaged, with the aim to improve the overall ship resilience when 
dealing with uncertainty of performance implied by HF element. The System-
Theoretic Accident Model Process (STAMP, Leveson 2003) is investigated as a 
suitable methodology able to provide a significant sset in such perspective. The 
approach is widely applied in many industrial and transportation fields but in order 
to better understand its application into the marine context, a specific application 
will be briefly commented. In the attempt to define a comprehensive procedure, as 
a preliminary overview, some selected models suitable to classify the human 
behavior will be considered with specific focus on the reasons for performance 
degrade and/or uncertainty.  
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1. Introduction 
The ship design process has changed radically in the latest decade especially for 
complex vessel (e.g. large passenger ships, navy vessels,…) characterized by intensive 
technology and outstanding intrinsic value. On the other side, the relevance of Human 
Factor in safety and operative ship performance is veryday evidence and recognized 
by fundamental rulemaking organizations like International Maritime Organization,  
IMO [1,2].  
It is evident the need to intensify the research activity, looking for innovative 
approaches enabling the human integration into shipperformance assessment during  
ship design process. This should be properly tuned with the consolidated 21st century  
trend at IMO i.e. the shift from prescriptive rule toward performance based approach. 
In fact the introduction of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) [3] and Goal Based 
Standard (GBS) [4] in the very first years of the 2000s has created the premise for an 
inexorable process toward the proactive attitude in ship safety and the performance 
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based approach during the ship design. In this evolutionary context, the so called 
Alternative Design [5,6] to SOLAS prescriptions has come out as well and  a new 
approach for Human Factor integration into the ship design process is expected to 
promising in relation to  such framework.  
A successful final outcome in terms of ship safety is the result of the appropriate 
merge among ship platform, active safety devices and crew members performance 
(Figure 1). To assess the comprehensive integration outcome among all these safety 
players is very difficult, barely imaginable in a traditional prescriptive approach. The 
very different nature of all the involved issues suggests the development of an ad hoc 
assessment method/design tool able to investigate the influence of human factor on the 
ship resilience. For the purpose of this paper shipresilience is specifically defined as 
the capability of the ship to absorb, i.e. to withstand and handle a human error. The 
core of ship resilience performance  is deemed to be the ensemble of active and passive 
systems (embedded in ship platform) devoted to ship afety. 
 
Figure 1. The ship safety comprehensive arena. 
 
The increasing automation level of ships, in principle inserted in order to support 
and complement the human beings in systems management and decision making, is 
also likely to create the effect of expropriating the control of the situation. This is the 
reason why this component should be considered into the model of ship resilience 
proposed in Figure 1, as a ring between HF and Active+Passive Systems . The aim of 
the innovative assessment method/tool is the comparison, during the design stage,  
among different solutions in order to spot the ship configuration less vulnerable to the 
human error effects. 
1.1. Goal Based Standard, Formal Safety Assessment and Alternative Design – an 
overview 
The notion of "Goal-Based ship Standards" (GBS) wasintroduced at IMO in 2002 
putting forward the concept that ship design and construction standards should be 
formulated allowing innovation in design process. At present, there is an increasing 
tendency to adopt a Goal-Based approach for regulations and there are good technical 
and commercial reasons for believing this approach to be preferable to more 
prescriptive regulation.  
“Goal-Based regulation”, in fact, by definition, does not specify the means of 
achieving compliance but it sets goals, allowing therefore alternative ways of achieving 
compliance. It is well known the example made in [7] i.e. “People shall be prevented 
from falling over the edge of a cliff” is Goal-Based. In prescriptive regulation the 
specific means of achieving compliance is specifically identified, e.g. “You shall install 
a 1 meter high rail at the edge of the cliff”. For this reason Goal-Based standards are 
considered a proper tool for the future evolution of international regulatory standards, 
since in principle they allow for a larger range of design solution, to be supported  
nevertheless by a robust safety evaluation. 
More or less at the same time, also Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) has been 
introduced at IMO and defined as a structured and systematic methodology, aimed at 
enhancing maritime safety, including protection of life, health, the marine environment 
and property, by using risk analysis and cost benefit assessment. 
FSA is considered an approach that in the longer term, can facilitate the 
development of rules and regulations targeting safety rather than technical details . 
















Figure 2. Conceptual and practical relation between GBS and FSA [8] 
 
For the long term, GBS are also associated with the concept of the so called 
“safety level”, discussed at MSC 91 together with the "safety-level approach” defined 
as the structured application of risk-based methodologies for the IMO rule-making 
process.  The risk based approach has been recognized as a possible methodology in 
order to verify/give evidence of goals achievements but the community recognized as 
well how it is challenging to develop a robust asses ment in terms of risk analysis.  
On the top of that, more or less again at the beginning of the 2000s  IMO has 
introduced  the possibility of Alternative Design ad arrangements to specific SOLAS 
chapters II-1 (parts C, D and E) and III, implying that safe engineering alternative 
design solutions can be considered equivalent to SOLAS by technical justification.  
Safety objectives and functional requirements are id ntified and these can be 
achieved either by compliance with the already existing prescriptive requirements or by 
alternative design and arrangements based on engineering analysis, evaluated and 
approved by the Administration. 
To this aim the MSC 92 delivered specific Guidelines [5] with a view to providing 
a consistent process for the coordination, review and pproval of alternatives and 
equivalents with regard to ship and system design as allowed by the 1974 SOLAS 
Convention. Within such Guidelines it is recognized that since a majority of incidents 
are strongly influenced by human error and operation l faults, the design team should 
find solutions that minimize potential human error, if at all viable and efficient. The 
Risk-based design is to be developed relying on a structured and systematic 
methodology aimed at ensuring safety performance and cost-effectiveness by using risk 
analysis and cost-benefit assessment: several analytical techniques, e.g. reliability, 
availability and maintainability engineering, statistics, decision theory, systems 
engineering, human behavior, etc. are to be applied in order to  successfully integrate 
diverse aspects of design and operation while assessing risk. 
In this paper the System-Theoretic Accident Model Process (STAMP) 
methodology [9] is proposed as a methodology for a further step forward, extending the 
meaning of risk assessment into a system engineering approach. The new paradigm 
relies of  control system theory and safety constraints enforcement; it might represent a 
new solution for new current and future problems related to safety of complex systems. 
2. The STAMP methodology 
In the traditional risk assessment causality models, accidents are considered to be 
caused by chains of failure events, each failure dictly causing the next one in the 
chain. However, these usual models are no longer adquate for the more complex 
sociotechnical systems that are being built nowadays. In particular this is a more and 
more evident issue when human factor integration is a determinant for the risk 
assessment. 
The first step is to extend the definition of accident causation beyond failure events 
in order to include component interaction and indirect or systemic causal mechanism. 
In achieving this objective, an accident can be defined as an unplanned and undesired 
loss event that could result in fact from component failures, disturbances external to the 
system, interactions among system components and behavior of individual system 
component leading to hazardous system states. 
2.1. General description 
In the latest years a new approach has been developed in order to investigate incidents 
and find suitable countermeasure to avoid future possible recurrence [9] . It is named 
Systems-Theoretic Accident Model  and Processes (STAMP) and it is based on a 
system engineering approach integrated with control theory and applied in system 
safety engineering. 
In STAMP, systems are dynamic processes that are continually adapting and 
accidents can be analyzed in terms of an adaptive feedback function that fails to 
maintain safety performance since system behavior changes overtime  to meet a 
complex sets of goals and values. In system engineering safety  is considered as an 
emergent property i.e. it arises from the interactions among the system components and 
it is controlled by imposing constraints on the behavior of and interactions among 
components. In this way, safety becomes a control problem where the goal of the 
control is to enforce the safety constraints. 
The most basic concept in STAMP is not an event, bu a constraint  and the 
importance of constraints is pointed out together with the concept that incidents are the 
results of an inadequate control and /or poor enforcement of constraints on safety 
related behavior.  
In system theory, systems are viewed as hierarchical structures, where each level 
imposes constraints on the activity of the level beneath. Control processes operate 
between levels to control the processes at lower levels in the hierarchy and these 
control processes enforce the safety constraints for which the control process is 




Figure 3. Safety as a Hierarchical Control structure  [9]  
 
Then, accidents occur when these processes provide ina quate control, that may 
result from missing constraints, inadequate safety control commands, commands that 
were not executed correctly at a lower level or inadequately communicated. For 
example, unsafe work instructions or procedures might be given to the operators, or 
instructions are appropriate and enforce the safety constraints but the operators may 
ignore them. In any case it is vital that feedback channels are provided to determine 
whether unsafe instructions were given or that safety-related instructions were not 
followed.  
In this new safety-related approach it is necessary to identify the safety constraints 
to be enforced and then to effectively design control p ocess/system to enforce them. 
To accomplish this goal, the first step is to state he system and component hazards in 
order to specify the system-level safety requirements and then design constraints 
necessary to prevent the hazard occurrence. These con traints will be used to guide the 
system design and tradeoff analyses in an iterative way in order to refine and expand 
the safety requirements and constraints that must be incorporated into the physical 
system design and into the safety control structure. 
Several applications have been carried out in different industrial and transportation 
fields. Most of the literature is reported as proceedings of several workshops organized 
by Massachusetts Institute of Technology MIT. In the following, an application of 
STAMP for US Navy Positioning System [10] is briefly presented. 
2.2.  Significant Application Case 
The research activity taken in exam  demonstrates th  efficacy of STAMP and the 
advantages that result from using this new safety analysis method compared to 
traditional techniques. Actually in the study one vry useful tool for STAMP 
application is explored i.e. the so called STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis) 
[11], that is a relatively new hazard analysis technique based on an extended model of 
accident causation. The study involves Naval Offshore Supply Vessels (OSV) equipped 
with software-intensive dynamic positioning system and operative in the escort activity 
of target vessel. In addition to component failures, STPA assumes that accidents can 
also be caused by unsafe interactions of system components, not necessarily by a 
system component failure. 
 The analysis begins by analyzing the OSVs in the context of the Navy’s organizational 
structure and then explores the functional relationship between OSV system 
components that can lead to unsafe control and the violation of existing safety 
constraints. The results of this analysis show that with STPA it is possible to find all of 
the component failures identified by traditional safety analyses of the OSV system. 
Moreover, the analysis shows that STPA finds many additional safety issues not 
identified or dealt with through the use of Fault Tree Analysis and Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis on this system.  
As put in evidence by the results of the STPA analysis on the OSV DP system, 
STPA provides a framework to identify unsafe control actions and causal scenarios that 
can lead to hazardous system states that fall outside of the failure-centric problem space 
captured by FTA and FMEA. Figure 4 illustrates this fundamental difference between 
FTA and FMEA’s focus compared to STPA’s focus.  
 
Figure 4.  STPA’s problem space compared to traditional Risk-based model [11]  
 
Since FTA and FMEA focus solely on failure scenarios, these methods cannot 
identify unsafe scenarios with no failure. Failure scenarios are in strict relation with 
reliability problems and not necessarily linked to safety problems (although failure 
scenarios may also be unsafe, as shown into the picture, Figure 4). The major point is 
that reliability does not guarantee safety. Because FTA and FMEA focus solely on 
failure scenarios, there is a whole category of unsafe cenarios that will not be captured 
when using these methods to conduct a safety analysis.  
While failure scenarios are identified as well, STPA permits the identification of 
hazardous situations that arise from unintended component interactions, inadequate 
design requirements, human errors and unsafe scenarios where no failures occur. STPA 
and FTA/FMEA techniques are difficult to compare but it has been shown that 
traditional methods like FTA and FMEA have limitations in comparison with the very 
interesting advantages of STPA. 
The assessment has focused in particular on the collision problem and results of 
the case study have been judged as very useful to improve the dynamic positioning 
system safety. 
3. Overview of methodologies for a Human Factor modeling  
Within the great challenge of integrating the Human Factor effect into the design 
process the need of a cross cutting paradigm for Human Factor description is perceived 
and, in the following, a selection of methodologies deserving attention for the purpose  
is given.  The selection is derived from [12]  and the very same book has inspired the 
idea to investigate the application of STAMP methodol gy for ship design in a safety 
performance perspective.  It is worthwhile to stress the concept that STAMP is the real 
kernel of the study proposed in this paper.  It is he comprehensive system based 
approach able to move the focus from the isolated specific human error to the general 
view where to spot the possible violation of safety constraints.  
Nevertheless in the next lines we briefly describe asically different and 
complementary  approaches that can characterize the Human Factor modeling, for 
example the kind and the mode of “different from exp cted” performance or the level 
of “uncertainty in the behavior” , useful framework to define the safety boundaries.  
3.1. ETTO 
An intensive research activity has been carried out in order to  identify and  classify 
human error in order to eliminate, prevent and recov r for it. The ETTO Principle [13] 
looks at the common behavior of people at work to adjust actions and performance to 
match the conditions - to what has happened, to what happens, and to what may 
happen. The concept is that efficiency-thoroughness trade-off (ETTO) is everyday life 
and usually thoroughness is sacrificed for efficieny.  From the point of view of HF 
characterization this binary concept (i.e. thoroughness and efficiency) can be very 
helpful to identify hazards and unsafe control actions. 
3.2. SHELL 
The SHELL model [14], is very powerful in expressing interactions and interfaces 
among the major players when human beings deals with complex technology and 
problems. Each person (i.e. center “L” see Figure 5) interacts with the other four 
components (i.e. S, H,E , L see below for description) and from this theory it can be 
assumed that that  interface issues  between the cent r L and any other four components  
leads to a source of human error. The capital letters r presented in figure 6 are 
respectively: 
H –Hardware, such as equipment, tools, workspace, machinery; S- Software, that 
comprehends all non-physical resources, like organizational policies/rules, procedures, 
manuals, automation; E- Environment, which  includes climate, temperature, vibration 
and noise, but also socio-political and economic factors. 
Finally a double L with different meaning is necessary: L- Liveware i.e. factors like 
teamwork, communication, leadership, hierarchy and L- Central Liveware, which is in 
the centre of the SHELL Model, and can be defined as human elements such as 
knowledge, attitudes, cultures and stress. The SHELL model could be effective in order 
to describe the control structure at the base of the STPA analysis. 
 
Figure 5. SHELL model 
3.3. SRK 
A very useful framework is given by Rasmussen [15] for identifying the types of 
error likely to occur in different operational situa ions, or within different aspects of the 
same task where different types of information processing demands on the individual 
may occur.  
The model Skill-Rule-Knowledge (SRK) permits to classify the human behavior in 
three levels, from the  performance relying on  a  lower  cognitive workload to the one 
that demands higher cognitive workload: 
- Skill-Based Behavior (SBB) – refers to the basic execution of actions for 
which the person in charge is extensively trained an there is virtually no 
conscious monitoring; 
-  Rule-Based  Behavior  (RBB)  – this level is defind when some rules are 
previously defined and they are supposed to be applied. These rules may have 
been learned through formal training, or by working with experienced process 
workers. The level of conscious control is intermediate between that of the 
knowledge and skill based modes;  
- Knowledge-Based  Behavior  (KBB)  –  The higher level is the knowledge 
based mode, the human carries out a task in an almost completely conscious 
manner. This would occur in a situation where a beginner was performing the 
task (e.g. a trainee process worker) or where an experienced individual was 
faced with a completely novel situation. 
There is a further evolution named GEMS (Generic Error Modeling System) [16] 
as an extension of the SRK Approach and is intended to describe how switching occurs 
between the different types of information processing (skill, rule, knowledge) in tasks 
and it is illustrated in Figure 6.  
SRK and GEMS are a very comprehensive model in order to define possible 
source and modality of human error and they can be very useful improve the 
description of HF interaction with complex technology and automation. 
 
 
Figure 6. Link among skills, rules and knowledge  [16] 
4. A proposal for a new approach 
In the frame of a performance based assessment for sa ety rules compliance it is 
necessary to effectively integrate Human Factor in the design process in an improved 
safety perspective.  
The traditional decision-making approach is inclined to see decisions as discrete 
processes that can be separated from the context in which the decisions are generated 
and to set up them as isolated phenomena. Nowadays, this view in some occasions is 
not appropriate, especially when dealing with operations of complex systems like large 
passenger ships or navy ships: instead of thinking about operations on board as 
predefined sequences of actions, human interaction w th a system is increasingly being 
considered to be a continuous control task in which separate decisions or errors are 
difficult to be identified.  
A new approach could be to assume that HF in the system can be treated in the 
same way as autonomous components; however, the causal nalysis and scenario 
generation for humans controllers and operators is much more complex than that of 
software devices, where the algorithm is known and can be modelled and assessed. The 
main difference between humans and automatic controllers is the intrinsic possibility 
that, for different reasons, the operator could feel th  necessity to change the procedure, 
even if they are given a procedure to follow. In other terms, humans control algorithm 
is dynamic and, in order to be realistic, has to be a l  to evolve as a result of feedback 
and changes in goals.  
Human decision making has to be viewed as a control model and its study has to 
be integrated with the study of the social context, the value system in which it takes 
place and the dynamic work process that is intended to be controlled and managed 
(Figure 7). The new view of Human Factor in the decision making process needs a new 
approach to represent and understand human behavior, focused not specifically on 
human error and violation of rules but on the mechanism generating behavior in the 
actual, dynamic context.   
 
Figure 7. A human controller /automated controller/ physical process model 
 
In this view of innovative integration of Human Factor in the ship design for 
improved safety and operations efficiency, STAMP is a promising tool since it is 
characterized by a systemic approach and dynamic analysis, that take into account the 
work system constraints, the boundaries of acceptable performance, the need for 
experimentation the subjective criteria guiding adaption to change. In this approach, it 
shall be very beneficial to refer to the interface human-machine not only in terms of 
traditional ergonomics, but considering the cognitive work/task analysis, in which 
behavior is modeled in terms of the objectives of the decision maker, the boundaries of 
acceptable performance and the adaptive mechanisms of the human actors.    
Such an approach leads to consider the operator behavior as a product of the 
environmental in which it occurs, so in order to reduce operator error the designer has 
to previously and effectively change the environment in which the operator works. In 
this way, the final aim has to be the comparison of different design solutions in terms 
of safety or operational performance, considering in the trade off exercise that the users 
are humans with all their peculiar and challenging characteristic.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper the need of an innovative approach to in egrate Human Factor 
performance into the ship design process has been evidenced. The recent IMO 
rulemaking evolution toward performance based assessm nt is assumed as a valid 
framework where to root a new methodology based on the STAMP approach, already 
extensively applied in several industrial and transportation fields. The most basic 
concept in STAMP is not an event, but a constraint  a d the importance of constraints 
is pointed out together with the concept that incidents are the results of an inadequate 
control and /or poor enforcement of constraints on safety related behavior. To 
investigate the possible application into the marine field, an existing study involving 
OSV vessels engaged in navy activity has been analyzed. In such application the STPA 
tool has shown to be more effective than more traditional risk analysis hazard 
identification approaches to spot out critical situations. 
The main outcome of this preliminary study is that uman beings can be visualized 
as a part of a complex model where they are supposed to be a control element that 
nevertheless should be characterized and studied appropriately. The great challenge is 
that for different reasons, the operator could feelth  necessity to change the procedure, 
even if they are given a procedure to follow. The ne d to find suitable paradigms for 
Human Factor characterization and description has been underlined as well into the 
paper and some interesting models derived from literature have been briefly described 
to this aim. 
As a conclusion it seems therefore that there are good premises for the formulation 
of a comprehensive approach based on the methodologies and models proposed above 
and in the next future some selected application cases will be identified in order to gain 
a further insight into the innovative methodology and to gain the experience about the 
real capability to overcome and complement traditional risk analysis when developing 
performance base safety assessment.  
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